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Condorcet (1785) initiated the statistical approach to vote aggregation. Two centuries later,
Young (1988) showed that a correct application of the maximum likelihood principle leads
to the selection of rankings called Kemeny orders, which have the minimal total number of
disagreements with those of the voters. The Condorcet-Kemeny-Young approach is based
on the assumption that the voters have the same probability of comparing correctly two
alternatives and that this probability is the same for any pair of alternatives. We relax
the second part of this assumption by letting the probability of comparing correctly two
alternatives be increasing with the distance between two alternatives in the allegedly true
ranking. This leads to a rule in which the majority in favor of one alternative against
another one is given a larger weight the larger the distance between the two alternatives
i nt h et r u er a n k i n g ,i . e .t h el a r g e rt h ep r o b a b ility that the voters compare them correctly.
This rule is not Condorcet consistent. Thus, it may be diﬀerent from the Kemeny rule. Yet,
it is anonymous, neutral, and paretian. However, contrary to the Kemeny rule, it does not
satisfy Young and Levenglick (1978)’s local independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Condorcet also hinted that the Condorcet winner or the top alternative in the Condorcet
ranking is not necessarily most likely to be the best. Young conﬁrms that indeed with
a constant probability close to 1/2 , this alternative is the Borda winner while it is the
alternative whose smallest majority is the largest when the probability is close to 1. We
extend his analysis to the case of variable probabilities. Young’s result implies that the
Kemeny rule does not necessarily select the alternative most likely to be the best. A natural
question that comes to mind is whether the rule obtained with variable probabilities does
better than the Kemeny rule in this respect. It appears that this performance improves with
t h er a t ea tw h i c ht h ep r o b a b i l i t yi n c r e a s e s .
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Condorcet a initié l’approche statistique à l’agrégation des votes. Deux siècles plus tard,
Young (1988) a montré qu’une application correcte du principe du maximum de vraisem-
blance mène à la sélection des ordres ayant un nombre total de désaccords minimal avec les
ordres des votants. En d’autres termes, ces ordres minimisent une distance proposée par Ke-
meny et, pour cette raison, on les appelle souvent les ordres de Kemeny. Lorsqu’il existe, i.e.
en l’absence de cycles dans la relation majoritaire, l’ordre de Condorcet est l’unique ordre de
Kemeny. L’approche de Condorcet-Kemeny-Young est basée sur l’hypothèse que les votants
ont la même probabilité de comparer correctement deux alternatives et que cette probabilité
est la même pour toute paire d’alternatives. Dans le présent papier, on relâche la deuxième
partie de cette hypothèse. La probabilité de comparer correctement deux alternatives peut
être croissante en la distance entre deux alternatives dans l’ordre considéré comme vérita-
ble. Cela mène à une règle dans laquelle la majorité en faveur d’une alternative contre une
autre reçoit un poids d’autant plus grand que la distance entre les deux alternatives est plus
grande, i.e. que la probabilité que les votants les comparent correctement est plus grande.
Cette règle n’est pas de type Condorcet. Par conséquent, elle est diﬀérente de la règle de
Kemeny. Cependant, elle est anonyme, neutre et parétienne mais, à la diﬀérence de la règle
de Kemeny, elle ne satisfait pas l’indépendance locale des alternatives non pertinentes.
Condorcet a également laissé entendre que le gagnant de Condorcet ou l’alternative à la
tête de l’ordre de Condorcet n’est pas nécessairement l’alternative la plus probable. Young
conﬁrme que en eﬀet, dans le cas d’une probabilité constante et près de 1/2, l’alternative
probablement la meilleure est le gagnant de Borda alors que c’est l’alternative dont la plus
petite majorité est la plus grande lorsque la probabilité est près de 1. On étend son analyse
au cas des probabilités variables. Le résultat de Young implique que la règle de Kemeny ne
sélectionne pas nécessairement l’alternative vraisemblablement la meilleure. Une question
normale qui vient à l’esprit est celle de savoir si la règle obtenue avec probabilités variables
se comporte mieux que la règle de Kemeny à cet égard. Il semble que cette performance
s’améliore eﬀectivement avec le taux auquel la probabilité croît.1 Introduction
Condorcet (1785) showed that with the simple majority rule, a group of individuals will
choose the better of two alternatives more frequently than a single individual. He also
studied the relation between the number of voters and the probability of selecting the best
alternative. The larger the number of voters, the larger this probability. This result, known
as Condorcet’s jury theorem, is obtained under the assumption that the voters have the same
competence level, i.e. the same probability, above 1
2, of choosing the right alternative.
Many authors have worked on relaxing this assumption. Nitzan and Paroush (1982) show
that the maximum likelihood rule, when the voters have unequal competence, is a weighted
majority rule, where the weight of each individual’s vote is a function of the competence level
of the voter. Shapley and Grofman (1984) study the case of correlated votes. They provide
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the weighted rule to be optimal. These results, along
with other extensions of the jury theorem, are gathered in Grofman, Owen, and Feld (1983).
More recent versions of the theorem are presented by Berg (1993, 1994) and Ladha (1992,
1993, 1995) for the case of correlated individual competencies and by Paroush (1998) for
heterogeneous competencies.
There has been no extension of the jury theorem to the case of more than two alternatives,
except for a brief discussion by Shapley and Grofman (1984) at the end of their paper. Yet,
Condorcet himself studied the problem of ranking a set of alternatives. His method consists
of ordering alternatives pairwise according to the majority rule. He showed that, if the
procedure yields an order on the set of alternatives, the latter is the most probable order.
This was one of the ﬁrst applications of the maximum likelihood principle.
Condorcet was well aware that the binary relation resulting from his procedure may
contain cycles. He proposed a method for breaking these cycles, but unfortunately, this
method gives consistent results only for the case of three alternatives. Young (1988) shows
that a correct application of the maximum likelihood principle leads to the selection of
rankings that have the minimal total number of disagreements with those of the voters. In
other words, these rankings minimize a “distance” proposed by Kemeny (1959) and for this
reason, they are often given the name of Kemeny. When it exists, i.e. in the absence of
cycles in the majority relation, the Condorcet ranking is the unique Kemeny ranking.
The Condorcet-Kemeny-Young approach is based on the assumption that the voters
have the same probability of comparing correctly two alternatives and that this probability
is the same for any pair of alternatives. In this paper, we relax the second part of this
assumption. We let the probability of comparing correctly two alternatives be increasing
1with the distance between two alternatives in the true ranking. This reﬂects the possibility
that voters or judges may have a better chance of correctly ranking two alternatives when
one is very good and the other very bad, than when facing two similar alternatives.
Increasing probabilities lead to a rule in which the majority in favour of one alternative
against another increases with the distance between the two alternatives. This result is
comparable to those of Nitzan and Paroush (1982) and of Grofman, Owen, and Feld (1983).
They obtain a rule in which weights vary across voters, as a result of unequal competencies
of the voters, while in our rule, weights may vary across pairs of alternatives because of
diﬀerent probabilities of ordering correctly alternatives in diﬀerent pairs.
Our rule is not Condorcet consistent. It does not necessarily select the Condorcet ranking
nor the Condorcet winner, when they exist. Actually, the selected ranking may change with
the speciﬁcation of the probabilities. Therefore, this rule is diﬀerent from the Kemeny
r u l e . H o w e v e r ,a si st h eK e m e n yr u l e ,i ti sa n o n y m o u s ,n e u t r a l ,a n dp a r e t i a n . A c c o r d i n g
to Young and Levenglick (1978), the Kemeny rule satisﬁes a property that they call “local
independence of irrelevant alternatives”. This is not the case of our rule.
Condorcet also hinted that the Condorcet winner, or the top alternative in the Condorcet
ranking, is not necessarily the most likely to be the best. Young (1988) conﬁrms that indeed
with a constant probability close to 1
2, the alternative most likely to be the best is the Borda
winner, while when the probability is close to 1, it is an alternative whose smallest majority
against other alternatives is at least as large as the smallest majority of any other alternative.
We extend his analysis to the case of variable probabilities.
Young’s result implies that the Kemeny rule does not necessarily select the alternative
that is most likely to be the best. A natural question that comes to mind is whether or
not the rule obtained with variable probabilities does better than the Kemeny rule in this
respect. It appears that this performance improves with the rate at which the probability
increases.
The structure of the paper is the following. The notation, the basic assumptions, the
voting procedure, and some useful concepts from social choice theory are presented in Section
2. The maximum likelihood approach for variable probabilities is described in Section 3.
Some properties of the rule arising from the general speciﬁcation of the probabilities are
discussed in Section 4. We show that the most likely ranking depends on the distribution
of the probabilities. In particular, the most likely ranking is not necessarily the Condorcet
ranking. Starting with Section 5, we present a systematic analysis of the case of three
alternatives for a particular class of increasing probability functions. The characterization
of the most likely rankings and of the alternatives most likely to be the best are provided in
2this section and Section 6 respectively. This last section also deals with the performance of
the choice rule resulting from the maximum likelihood approach in terms of the alternative
most likely to be the best. A brief conclusion is presented as a ﬁnal section.
2 The social choice problem
Let X = {a,b,c,...} be the set of alternatives or candidates to be ranked. The cardinality
of X is m. W ed e n o t eb yB the set of complete and asymmetric binary relations on X
and by R the subset of complete orders on X also called rankings. A complete order on
X can be represented by a permutation of the elements of the vector (1,2,...,m), denoted
r =( ra,r b,r c,...), where ra is the rank of a, rb the rank of b, and so on. Equivalently,
an order can be represented by a sequence s1s2s3 ...where s1,s 2,s 3 ...are respectively the
alternatives with ranks 1,2,3,....
There is a set I = {1,2,...,n} of voters or judges. Each is asked to compare the
alternatives pair by pair, as in the Condorcet procedure. His or her vote is summarized in a
matrix Ni =[ νi
st]s,t∈X . For any pair of alternatives (s,t) ∈ X2,ν i
st =1if voter i chooses s
over t and νi
st =0otherwise, and νi
st =0if s = t. Alternatively, we can ask each voter i to
ﬁll in Ni according to the previous convention. Each Ni is an element of B. Since only the






and we let N be the set of possible polls on X.
Once the voters or judges have expressed their opinions in a poll, the problem is to
aggregate these opinions in order to select a ﬁnal ranking. We formalize this idea in the
following deﬁnition and give examples of aggregation rules, before turning to the maximum
likelihood approach.
Deﬁnition 1 An aggregation rule is a correspondence FR : N → R that assigns to each
poll N, a ﬁnal ranking or a subset of ﬁnal rankings FR(N) of the alternatives.
Consider now the correspondence FRM : N → B deﬁned by sFR M (N) t ⇔ νst >ν ts.
The binary relation FRM (N) is the majority relation issued from the poll N. We assume
that FRM (N) is complete, which is always the case when n is odd. However, it is not
necessarily transitive: it may contain cycles.
3Condorcet advocated the use of FRM as an aggregation rule when FRM (N) is an order.
He also proposed a method for breaking eventual cycles in FRM (N), which does not work
when there are more than three alternatives. We shall return to this point later.
Deﬁnition 2 Given a poll N, if FRM (N) is an order, we call this order the Condorcet
ranking.
Another well known example of an aggregation rule is due to Borda (1784). It is a scoring
method with the vector of scores (m − 1,m− 2,...,2,1,0). An alternative receives m − 1
points if it is ranked ﬁrst by a voter, m − 2 if it is ranked second, ..., and 0 points if it is
last. The scores of each alternative are then aggregated across voters and alternatives are
ordered according to the sums of these scores. It can be checked that the sum of the scores
for alternative s is equal to
P
τ∈X νsτ. This prompts the following deﬁnition.









νs3,τ ≥ ··· (1)
is a Borda ranking. The Borda rule is the correspondence FRB : N → R that assigns to
each poll N, t h es e to fB o r d ar a n k i n g s .T h en u m b e r
P
τ∈X νsτ is called the Borda score of
s.
Remark 1 Strictly speaking, this deﬁnition is correct only if each individual vote in the
poll is transitive, which we do not assume, to be consistent with the binary approach. This
abuse of terminology will simplify the presentation throughout the paper.
Any aggregation rule FR induces a social choice correspondence that assigns to each
poll N, t h es u b s e to fa l t e r n a t i v e st h a ta r et o pr a n k e di na tl e a s to n er a n k i n gi nFR(N).
Accordingly, we have the following concepts.
Deﬁnition 4 A Borda winner for a poll N is the top ranked alternative in at least one
Borda ranking.
Deﬁnition 5 The Condorcet winner for a poll N, if it exists, is the alternative s that
satisﬁes νst >ν ts ∀t 6= s.
We also have the following type of winner even if we do not deﬁne a corresponding
aggregation rule.
4Deﬁnition 6 AKramer-Simpson winner for a poll N is an alternative s such that maxτ ντs ≤
maxτ ντu ∀u ∈ X or, equivalently, minτ νsτ ≥ minτ νuτ ∀u ∈ X.
Deﬁnition 7 An aggregation rule FR : N → R has the Condorcet property if FR(N)=
FRM (N) for every poll N such that FRM (N) is an order. Similarly, a social choice corre-
spondence has the Condorcet property if it selects exclusively the Condorcet winner when it
exists.
It is well known that the Borda rule does not have the Condorcet property. It does not
necessarily produce a ranking that has the Condorcet winner as the top alternative.
3 The maximum likelihood approach
The maximum likelihood approach to voting was initiated by Condorcet (1785). It starts
with the assumption that there exists a true ranking r ∈ R on the set of alternatives. The
true ranking, however, is not known. Experts, i.e. voters or judges, are then asked to provide
their opinion as to what should be considered the true ranking. Their opinions are collected
in Ni,i=1 ,...,n.
Assuming that every voter has the same probability (larger than 1
2) of correctly comparing
any two alternatives, Condorcet showed that if the binary relation FRM (N) is an order, then
it is the most likely ranking. He also oﬀered indications on how to break the cycles that
FRM (N) might contain. Unfortunately, these indications yield consistent results only for the
case of three alternatives. Young (1988) shows what a correct application of the maximum
likelihood principle leads to.
It is this approach that we pursue here with a more ﬂexible representation of the compe-
tence of the experts. The vote of expert i on a pair of alternatives (s,t) is a random variable
˜ νi
st ∈ {0,1}, conditional on the true ranking r. Again, each voter has the same probability
of ranking correctly two alternatives and this probability is the same for any two couples of
alternatives (s,t),(u,v) ∈ X2 such that such that rs−rt = ru−rv. However, this probability
is a non-decreasing function of the distance between the two alternatives in the true ranking.





.G i v e nar a n k i n gr ∈ R, a function p ∈ Pm, and two alternatives s,t ∈ X such that
rs <r t, the conditional distributions of ˜ νi
st and ˜ νi


























=1− p(rt − rs)
5The probabilities are assumed to be strictly less than unity to avoid degenerate distributions.
This distribution on pairs of alternatives induces a conditional probability distribution on


















Remark 2 At this stage, it is important to point out an important fact that is not always
mentioned in the literature on the binary approach. Given the independence of p across
pairs of alternatives, cyclical relations in B have a positive probability, even if r is an order.




















since p(2) < 1. There is thus a positive conditional probability that a judge’s vote be cyclical.
This is the reason for not assuming that individual votes Ni are transitive. Interestingly,
making p(2) larger than p(1) contributes in diminishing the probability of observing a cycle.
We focus now on the aggregate N.The entries of N are random variables ˜ νst ∈ {0,1,...,n}.





are independent and the same for all voters, each ran-
dom variable ˜ νst ≡
Pn
i=1 ˜ νi
st has a binomial distribution deﬁned by:
















for any i ∈ I. With the independence assumption across pairs of alternatives, the probability





Pr(˜ νst = νst | r)
This is the likelihood function of poll N, given order r. As an illustration, consider the set








with κ = n!3
νab!νba!νbc!νcb!νac!νca!. Note that this term is independent of the function p(·).
In the maximum likelihood approach, we are interested in a ranking r∗ (not necessar-
ily unique) that maximizes the likelihood function Pr(N | r) of poll N. Equivalently, this
ranking maximizes the posterior probability Pr(r | N), conditional on N. These posterior















q∈R Pr(N | q)
(3)
Under the assumption of a constant prior for rankings, the prior probability that an alter-
native s be ranked ahead of another alternative t is then exactly 1
2, for any pair (s,t). It is
clear that for the true ranking r, Pr(r | N) → 1 when n →∞ . This is also an implication
of the Condorcet jury theorem.
Note that Pr(r | N) is an increasing transformation of Pr(N | r). The following other
transformation will prove useful in deriving some of the results. Given a probability function






∀k ∈ {1,...,m− 1} (4)


















Clearly, rp is another aggregation rule.
Deﬁnition 8 Given a function p ∈ Pm, rp : N → R is the aggregation rule that assigns to
each poll N the set of most likely rankings, i.e. the set rp(N) ⊂ R.
rp induces a social choice correspondence that assigns to each poll N, the subset of alterna-
tives that are top ranked in at least one ranking in rp(N).
Deﬁnition 9 Γp : N → X deﬁned by:
Γp(N)={s ∈ X : ∃r ∈ rp(N):rs =1 }
is the social choice correspondence induced by rp.





is the one studied by Young. He shows that
a ranking that has the greatest posterior probability is a ranking with minimum “distance”
from the poll. The distance here is the one proposed by Kemeny (1959). Hence, with
constant probability, the most likely rankings are often called Kemeny orders. The distance
is deﬁned as follows. Let γst : R2 → R, be a function deﬁned for every couple of alternatives





1 if ˆ rs < ˆ rt and rs >r t
1
2 if ˆ rs =ˆ rt and rs <r t
0 otherwise








γst (ˆ r,r) (5)
Note that cK is a metric on the set of weak orders on X. The Kemeny “distance” δ
K between










Deﬁnition 10 The Kemeny rule is the correspondence FRK : N → R that assigns to each
poll N, the subset FRK (N)=a r gm i n r∈R δ
K (r,N). The elements of FRK (N) are Kemeny
orders.





, the most likely orders are the Kemeny orders,
i.e. rp(N)=FRK (N).












The value of K (r;N),c a l l e dt h eKemeny score of order r given the poll N, is the total
number of agreements between order r and the individual orders making up proﬁle N. Thus,
with a constant probability, the maximum likelihood approach consists in ﬁnding an order
r maximizing K (r;N).
84 Properties of rp and Γp
The question that we now address is whether the aggregation rule rp and the social choice
correspondence Γp give results that are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those of the Kemeny rule
when the function p is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from p(k)=¯ p. We know that the Kemeny rule
has the Condorcet property. We show in the following proposition that this property is not
generally preserved by rp and Γp. Therefore, rp and Γp may give results diﬀerent from those
of the Kemeny rule.
Proposition 1 rp and Γp do not have the Condorcet property for every probability function
p.
Proof. Consider the following poll N on X = {a,b,c,d} with n =9:
alternatives abcd
a − 555
b 4 − 57
c 44 − 6
d 423 −
Note that a and abcd are the Condorcet winner and ranking respectively. The Borda ranking
is bacd.1 However, with p(k)=¯ p1/k and ¯ p<0.7048775, the most likely ranking is bacd.
In the previous example, abcd is the most likely ranking for ¯ p>0.7048775. How is it that
rp(N) is the Condorcet ranking and Γp(N) the Condorcet winner only if the probability ¯ p
is suﬃciently high? Why is bacd more likely than abcd for ¯ p suﬃciently small? Note that
the Kemeny score K (abcd;N) is the sum of the numbers above the diagonal of the matrix
N while K (bacd;N) is the sum of the numbers above the diagonal of the following matrix,




a 5 − 55
c 44 − 6
d 243 −
Since the ﬁrst sum (33) is larger than the second (32), abcd beats bacd under the Kemeny
rule. By a continuity argument, this is also the case under rp with the increasing function
1This is the true Borda ranking since there exists a proﬁle of 9 transitive votes summing to N.
9p(k)=¯ p1/k and with ¯ p suﬃciently close to 1.N o t et h a tal a r g e r¯ p means a lower increase rate
of the probability with respect to k, and hence a probability function closer to a constant.
With an increasing function p, the farther the numbers from the diagonal the larger the
weights they receive. With ¯ p =0 .51, the numbers just above the diagonal are given the
weight 0.04 while those that are 2 and 3 positions away from the diagonal are given the
weights 0.9156 and 1.3798 respectively. With the latter weight, the νbd =7 , which replaces
the νad =5of the ﬁrst table, more than compensates for the replacements of the sum
νac +νbd =1 2by νbc +νad =1 0and of the sum νab +νbc +νcd =1 6by νba +νac +νcd =1 5 .
This is why bacd beats abcd.
With this example, one can also see the logic behind these variable weights. With
¯ p =0 .51, the voters have roughly the same probability of ordering correctly or incorrectly
two adjacent alternatives in a ranking. Thus, we should not give too much importance to
the majority that an alternative obtains against an adjacent one. This is not the case for
alternatives that are farther apart in the true ranking. For instance, the majority of 7 votes
for b against 2 for d in the above poll is given more importance when bacd is taken as the true
ranking because the voters who rank b before d have a larger probability of voting correctly:
0.511/3 =0 .798957 compared to 0.51 for pairs of alternative just above the diagonal.
The rule rp and the correspondence Γp being generally diﬀerent from the Kemeny rule
and correspondence, the question now is whether rp and Γp verify properties, other than the
Condorcet property, that are satisﬁed by the Kemeny rule and correspondence. The latter
satisfy anonymity and neutrality. The Kemeny correspondence is also paretian. We shall see
that these properties are still satisﬁed by the more general rule rp and correspondence Γp. In
the case of the Pareto principle, we shall establish the result for transitive votes. However,
rp no longer satisﬁes a condition that Young (1995) calls local independence of irrelevant
alternatives, which is satisﬁed by the Kemeny rule.
Anonymity or symmetry Clearly, rp and Γp are both symmetric for every p ∈ Pm:
individual votes are treated identically by either function.
Neutrality It is also obvious that rp and Γp are neutral: the alternatives are treated
identically. Names do not matter.
10Weak Pareto principle An alternative is a weak Pareto optimum if there is no other
alternative that the voters unanimously prefer. The weak Pareto principle applied to Γp says
that, for every poll N, Γp (N) contains only weak Pareto optima:
∀N ∈ N, ∀p ∈ P




t ∀i ∈ I
Note that this principle does not imply that Γp (N) contains all weak Pareto optima. Actu-
ally, Γp (N) selects one (or more) of these optima. The next lemma will be useful to prove
that Γp satisﬁes the weak Pareto principle.
Lemma 2 Let X = {1,2,...,s,...,m} and N be a poll such that νs1 = n and νsh ≥
ν1h ∀h 6=1 ,s.Next, consider the rankings r =( 1 ,2,...,s,...,m) and ˆ r =( s,2,...,1,...,m),
where ˆ r is obtained by interchanging 1 and s in r.T h e n ,Mp(ˆ r;N) >M p(r;N).
Proof. It is cumbersome but nonetheless straightforward to verify that:










Lp(h +1− s)(ν1,h+1 − νs,h+1)










[Lp(h) − Lp(h +1− s)](νs,h+1 − ν1,h+1)
The terms of the last expression have either the form (νsh − ν1h) or (νh1 − νhs). Since
νsh ≥ ν1h is equivalent to νh1 ≥ νhs ∀h 6=1 ,s,all the terms (νsh − ν1h) and (νh1 − νhs) are
non-negative. Their coeﬃcients also are non-negative. Furthermore, Lp(s−1)(νs,1−ν1,s) > 0,
hence Mp(ˆ r;N) − Mp(r;N) > 0.
Proposition 3 For every function p ∈ Pm, Γp satisﬁe st h ew e a kP a r e t op r i n c i p l eo nt h e
subset of polls resulting from transitive individual votes.
Proof. Consider a poll N. Assume that alternative 1 is selected by Γp (N) and that all
voters prefer s to 1. Then, we have νs1 = n and since all votes are transitive, we also have
νsh ≥ ν1h ∀h 6=1 . Indeed, those preferring 1 to h must also prefer s to h since they prefer
s to 1. Under the terms of Lemma 2, we also have Mp(ˆ r;N) >M p(r;N), which excludes
alternative 1 from Γp (N), a contradiction.
11Local independence of irrelevant alternatives Arrow’s (1951) independence of
irrelevant alternatives says that, when aggregating individual rankings, only the way voters
order alternatives within a pair should matter to arrive at a ﬁnal ranking on the same pair.
The Condorcet rule, which leads to the majority relation FRM (N), respects this condition,
but it can produce cycles. On the other hand, rp, and in particular the Kemeny rule, violates
Arrow’s independence condition. This violation is expected since rp gives consistent rankings
on the set of alternatives. Indeed, in a famous theorem, Arrow (1951) shows that there is
no aggregation rule of transitive individual preferences that results in a transitive collective
preference, that satisﬁes independence of irrelevant alternatives, and that is paretian, unless
it is dictatorial or unless we restrict the set of admissible preferences. In the light of the
same theorem, cycles in FRM (N) are also to be expected.
This led Young and Levenglick (1978) to deﬁne a weaker condition that they call local
independence of irrelevant alternatives. This condition requires that the ranking of any
subset of successive alternatives (forming an interval) in the ranking produced by a rule
should remain unchanged if we ignore alternatives that are outside this subset (interval).
For example, with 5 alternatives, if a rule selects the ranking abcde, it should select the
ranking bcd when applied to the subset formed by these three alternatives. Young and
Levenglick show that the Kemeny rule is the only rule to satisfy this weaker independence
condition along with some other desirable conditions.
The example in the proof of Proposition 1 shows that rp does not satisfy this local
independence condition for every choice of the probability function p. In that example, if we
set p(k)=0 .61/k and if we restrict the vote to {a,b,c}, the most likely ranking is abc while
it is bacd on {a,b,c,d}. Thus, the interval bac of the most likely ranking is changed for abc
when alternative d is ignored. This is a violation of the local independence condition.
Actually, d plays an important role in the determination of the most likely ranking on
{a,b,c,d}. As it is defeated under the majority rule by each of the other alternatives, d
cannot be the top ranked alternative in the most likely ranking regardless of the value of ¯ p.
However, it is the 7 votes for b over d compared to the 5 votes for a over d that makes bacd
more likely than abcd when ¯ p is suﬃciently close to 1
2, i.e. when the relative weights of the
majorities have a large dispersion.
5 The most likely rankings with three alternatives
Section 4 showed the importance of the choice of the function p in the selection of the
most likely ranking. In particular, the Borda ranking can be selected as the most likely
12ranking over the Condorcet order and the Borda winner can be selected by Γp instead of the
Condorcet winner. In this section, we return to this question in a more systematic way for
t h ec a s ew h e r eX = {a,b,c}, where the Kemeny ranking is unique and where p belongs to
the class of logistic probability functions deﬁned by:
p(k;α,β)=
eα+β(k−1)
1+eα+β(k−1), with α>0 and β ≥ 0 (6)
In this deﬁnition, k is again the distance between two alternatives and the parameter β
c o n t r o l st h er a t ea tw h i c hp increases with respect to k. The larger β, the higher this rate.
With β =0 , the probability is constant. And the larger α, the larger the probability. Figure
1 shows how the probability varies with α when β =0 .









With no loss of generality, we assume that abc i st h eK e m e n yr a n k i n g . W ed e n o t eb y
N 3Ku the subset of polls on {a,b,c} for which abc is the unique Kemeny ranking. The next
lemma will allow us to partition N 3Ku into three subsets. As we shall see, the most likely
ranking depends not only on the values of the parameters α and β but also on which of these
three subsets the poll belongs to.
Lemma 4 For every poll N ∈ N 3Ku:
1. νab > n
2 >ν ba;
2. νbc > n
2 >ν cb;
133. min{νab,νbc} >ν ca.
4. Moreover, abc is the Condorcet ranking if and only if νac > n
2 >ν ca.
Proof.
1. Since K (abc;N)=νab+νbc+νac >ν ba+νac+νbc = K (bac;N), we immediately have
νab >ν ba. The fraction n
2 is included between these two numbers since νab + νba = n.
2. Since K (abc;N) >K(acb;N), we immediately have νbc >ν cb.
3. Since K (abc;N)=νab+νbc+νac >ν bc+νba+νca = K (bca;N), we have νab+n−νca >
νca + n − νab, and thus νab >ν ca. Similarly, since K (abc;N)=νab + νbc + νac >
νca +νab +νcb = K (cab;N), we have νbc +n−νca >ν ca +n−νbc, and thus νbc >ν ca.
4. By deﬁnition and by 1 and 2.
In light of Lemma 4, only three entries of the matrix N ∈ N 3Ku can qualify as being
possibly the largest: νab,νbc,νac. To avoid future complications, we assume that these three
cases are mutually exclusive. Consequently, we can partition N 3Ku into three non-empty
subsets N1, N2,a n dN3 :
•N 1 gathers all the polls for which max{νst : s,t ∈ X} = {νac};
•N 2 gathers those for which max{νst : s,t ∈ X} = {νab};
•N 3 gathers those for which max{νst : s,t ∈ X} = {νbc}.
The results of this section are summarized in Table 1.
In N1,a b cis the Condorcet ranking and it is also the most likely ranking for any values of
the parameters α and β.In N2 and in N3,a b cis still the most likely for values of α suﬃciently
large, given the value of β. For suﬃciently small values of α, acb is the most likely in N2 and
bac is the one in N3. Actually, with α suﬃciently small, the top alternative in the most likely
ranking is the alternative that has the largest majority in all binary comparisons while the
alternative that is defeated with the largest majority by the top alternative is at the bottom
of the most likely ranking.
In N2 as in N1, since a is the top alternative of the most likely ranking be it abc or acb, it
is the alternative selected by Γp. However, in N3,bcan be selected if α is suﬃciently small.
14Type of poll N1 N2 N3
max{νst : s,t ∈ X} νac νab νbc
rp abc ∀α,β
abc if α>ˇ α(β;N)
acb if α<ˇ α(β;N)
abc if α>ˆ α(β;N)
bac if α<ˆ α(β;N)
Γp a ∀α,β a ∀α,β
a if α>˜ α(β;N)
b if α<˜ α(β;N)
Table 1: Summary of the results
When is the Borda ranking the most likely and when does Γp select the Borda winner?
The next proposition and remark provide some answers to this question. Another proposition
establishes that in N 3Ku,ais the unique Kramer-Simpson winner.
Proposition 5 For every poll N ∈ N1 ∪ N2, a is the unique Borda winner. For every poll
N ∈ N1,a b cis the unique Borda ranking.
Proof. In N1, we have νac >ν bc. According to Lemma 4, we also have νab >ν ba.
Therefore, νab + νac >ν ba + νbc. In N2, we have νab >ν ca and therefore νac >ν ba. We also
have νab >ν bc. Therefore, νab + νac >ν ba + νbc. In N1, we have νac >ν ab and therefore
νba >ν ca. F r o mL e m m a4 ,w ea l s oh a v eνbc >ν cb. Thus, νba + νbc >ν ca + νcb, which means
that abc is the Borda ranking.
Remark 4 In N2, the Borda ranking might be acb as well as abc. In N3, we can verify that
νba+νbc >ν ca+νcb. However, νab+νac can be larger, equal or less than νba+νbc. Therefore,
the Borda ranking can be bac or abc. In summary, in N1, the most likely ranking is always the
Borda ranking. It is not always the case in N2 and N3 since the most likely ranking depends
on the value of the parameters α and β. As for Γp, it always selects the Borda winner in N1
and N2 but not in N3.
Proposition 6 For every poll N ∈ N 3Ku,ais the unique Kramer-Simpson winner.
Proof. It is well known and easy to verify that the Condorcet winner, when it exists, is
also the unique Kramer-Simpson winner. Thus, let us focus on the polls for which there is
no Condorcet winner. These are the polls in N2 and N3 such that νca >ν ac.
In N2, we have νab >ν bc >ν ca >ν ac >ν cb >ν ba according to Lemma 4. Therefore,
νab >ν ac,ν bc >ν ba, and νca >ν cb. Since νac >ν cb >ν ba,ais the alternative for which the
smallest majority is the largest. Thus, it is the unique Kramer-Simpson winner.
15In N3, we have νbc >ν ab >ν ca >ν ac >ν ba >ν cb. Therefore, νab >ν ac,ν bc >ν ba, and
νca >ν cb. Since νac >ν ba >ν cb,ais again the unique Kramer-Simpson winner.





Thus, the function Lp deﬁn e di n( 4 )t a k e st h ef o r m :
L(k;α,β)=Lp (k)=α + β (k − 1)
In the case of three alternatives and for order stu,w et h e r e f o r eh a v e :
M (stu;N,α,β)=Mp (stu;N)=α(νst + νtu)+( α + β)νsu = α(νst + νtu + νsu)+βνsu
Note that M (stu;N,α,0) = αK (stu;N).
Lemma 7 For every α>0, every β ≥ 0 and every poll N ∈ N 3Ku:
1. M (abc;N,α,β) >M(bca;N,α,β);
2. M (abc;N,α,β) >M(cab;N,α,β);
3. M (acb;N,α,β) >M(cba;N,α,β).
Proof.
1. From Lemma 4, we have νab >ν ca. Therefore, νac >ν ba and νab+νbc >ν bc+νca. This
implies M (abc;N,α,β) >M(bca;N,α,β).
2. Similarly, we have νbc >ν ca, which implies νac >ν cb and νab + νbc >ν ca + νab.T h u s ,
M (abc;N,α,β) >M(cab;N,α,β).
3. Finally, we have νab >ν ca, which implies νac >ν ba and νac + νcb >ν cb + νba. Thus,
M (acb;N,α,β) >M(cba;N,α,β).
Corollary 8 For every α>0, every β ≥ 0, and every poll N ∈ N 3Ku, the most likely
ranking is either acb, abc, or bac.
16The most likely ranking in N1 For the polls of N1, things are simple: abc is both the
Condorcet ranking and the Borda ranking. It is also the most likely ranking for all values of
the parameters α and β.
Proposition 9 For every α>0, every β ≥ 0, and every poll N ∈ N1, the most likely
ranking is abc.
Proof. We know that abc is the most likely ranking for β =0 , i.e. M (abc;N,α,0) >
M (stu;N,α,0) ∀stu 6= abc. Since νac =m a x {νst : s,t ∈ X},M(abc;N,α,β) increases more
rapidly than M (stu;N,α,β) when β increases, preserving the inequality M (abc;N,α,β) >
M (stu;N,α,β).
The most likely rankings in N2 For the polls of N2, things are a little more complex than
in N1. For β suﬃciently small, abc is still the most likely ranking but, for suﬃciently large
values of β, acb becomes the most likely in spite of the fact that max{νst : s,t ∈ X} = {νab}.
However, Γp (N)={a} regardless of the value of β.
Proposition 10 For every α>0, every β ≥ 0, and every poll N ∈ N2, the most likely
ranking is either abc or acb.
Proof. By deﬁnition of N2,w eh a v eνab >ν bc. Therefore, νcb >ν ba and νac+νcb >ν ba+
νac. It follows that M (acb;N,α,β) >M(bac;N,α,β).T h i s e l i m i n a t e s bac as potentially
the most likely ranking in N2. The rankings bca,cab, and cba were eliminated in Corollary
8.





For every β ≥ 0, we have:
Pr(abc | N,α,β) T Pr(acb | N,α,β) ⇔ 0 <αT ˇ α(β;N)
Proof. ˇ α(β;N) is the solution of M (abc;N,α,β)=M (acb;N,α,β) with respect to α.
The direction of the inequalities comes from νab + νbc + νac >ν ac + νcb + νab.
The most likely rankings in N3 The analysis of N3 is similar to that of N2. For β
suﬃciently small, abc is still the most likely ranking, but for suﬃciently large values of β,
it is bac that becomes the most likely. In contrast to what happens in N2, Γp (N) changes
with β.
17Proposition 12 For every α>0, every β ≥ 0, and every poll N ∈ N3, the most likely
ranking is either abc or bac.
Proof. By deﬁnition of N3,w eh a v eνbc >ν ab. Therefore, νba >ν cb and νba + νac >
νac + νcb. It follows that M (bac;N,α,β) >M(acb;N,α,β). Thus, acb is eliminated from
the list of the potentially most likely rankings in N3. The rankings bca,cab, and cba were
eliminated by Corollary 8.





For every β ≥ 0, we have:
Pr(abc | N,α,β) T Pr(bac | N,α,β) ⇔ 0 <αT ˆ α(β;N)
Proof. ˆ α(β;N) is the solution of M (abc;N,α,β)=M (bac;N,α,β) with respect to α.
The direction of the inequalities comes from νab + νbc + νac >ν ba + νac + νbc.
Remark 6 It is easy to verify that for every β>0,w eh a v e :
ˆ α(β;N) <β if a is the Borda winner
ˆ α(β;N)=β if a and b are Borda winners
ˆ α(β;N) >β if b is the Borda winner
6 Alternatives most likely to be the best
Condorcet made a distinction between the most likely ranking and the alternative most likely
to be the best. He was apparently aware that the alternative with the largest probability
of being the best is not necessarily the top alternative in the most likely ranking. Young
(1988) shows that indeed with a constant probability close to 1
2, the alternative most likely
to be the best is the Borda winner, which may be diﬀerent from the top alternative in the
most likely ranking. With a probability suﬃciently large, the alternative most likely to be
the best is the Kramer-Simpson winner. We extend Young’s analysis to the more ﬂexible
formulation of the probabilities adopted in this paper, again for the case m =3 .
According to Young’s approach, a is the best alternative if it is at the same time better
than b and better than c. Denoting the relation “a is better than b”b ya Â b, the proba-
bility that a is the best alternative, conditional on the poll N, is, under the independence
assumption, given by:
Pr(a | N)=P r( a Â b | N)Pr(a Â c | N)
18The computation of the probabilities Pr(a Â b | N) and Pr(a Â c | N) c a nb ed o n eu n a m -
biguously with constant probabilities. However, this is not so with variable probabilities,
since the distance between the alternatives in a given ranking is lost in the above formula.
Thus, we need to develop an approach that captures the notion of distance between the
alternatives.
Note that:
[a Â b ∧ a Â c]=[ a Â b ∧ a Â c] ∧ [b Â c ∨ c Â b]=[ a Â b Â c] ∨ [a Â c Â b]
In other words, a i sa tt h es a m et i m eb e t t e rt h a nb and better than c if and only if abc or acb
is the most likely ranking. Thus, the probability that a is the best alternative, conditional
on the poll N, is given by:
Pr(a | N)=P r( abc | N)+P r( acb | N)
We obtain similar expressions for alternatives b and c.2 With this approach, the computation
of the probabilities is clear and consistent, whether the probability is constant or increasing.
We establish a ﬁrst general result.
Lemma 14 For every α>0, every β ≥ 0 and every poll N ∈ N 3Ku, the alternative most
likely to be the best is either a or b.
Proof. By Lemma 7, Pr(abc | N,α,β) > Pr(cab | N,α,β) and Pr(acb | N,α,β) >
Pr(cba | N,α,β). Therefore, Pr(a | N,α,β) > Pr(c | N,α,β).
Which of a or b is the alternative most likely to be the best depends once again on the
values of the parameters α and β and on the type of poll. The last row of Table 1 summarizes
the results of this section.
2The three events
[a Â b Â c] ∨ [a Â c Â b], [b Â a Â c] ∨ [b Â c Â a], [c Â b Â a] ∨ [c Â a Â b]
are not exhaustive. We also have the event [a Â b Â c Â a] ∨ [a Â c Â b Â a], i.e. the possibility that there
is no best alternative or that the poll is the result of a cyclical relation rather than an order. This is why
the probabilities of the three alternatives do not add up to 1 in Young’s formulation. With uniform prob-
abilities, we can deﬁne Pr(N | a Â b Â c Â a) unambiguously. This is not so with increasing probabilities.
For example, is a one position behind c or two positions ahead of c in the cycle a Â b Â c Â a?T h u s ,w e
must ignore these events. This is why we wrote Pr(r | N)=
Pr(N|r) P
q∈R Pr(N|q) rather than
Pr(N|r) P
q∈B Pr(N|q) in (3) of
Section 3.
19The alternative most likely to be the best in N1 and N2 For the polls of N1 and
N2, the alternative most likely to be the best is always a. Let us recall that a is at the same
t i m et h eK e m e n y ,t h eK r a m e r - S i m p s o na n dt h eB o r d aw i n n e r .T h u s ,t h ea l t e r n a t i v em o s t
likely to be the best is given by Γp (N).
Proposition 15 For every α>0, every β ≥ 0, and every poll N ∈ N1 ∪ N2, a is the
alternative most likely to be the best.
Proof. In N1, we have Pr(abc | N,α,β) > Pr(bac | N,α,β) from Proposition 9. By def-
inition of N1,ν ac >ν bc and according to Lemma 4, νab >ν ba. Therefore, νcb >ν ca and νac+
νcb >ν bc + νca. Then, we have M (acb;N,α,β) >M(bca;N,α,β), i.e. Pr(acb | N,α,β) >
Pr(bca | N,α,β). Combining these two inequalities, we obtain:
Pr(a | N,α,β)=P r ( abc | N,α,β)+P r( acb | N,α,β)
> Pr(bac | N,α,β)+P r( bca | N,α,β)=P r( b | N,α,β)
In N2, we have νab >ν bc and from Lemma 4, νab >ν ba. Therefore, νcb >ν ba and νac +
νcb >ν ba + νac. Then, we have M (acb;N,α,β) >M(bac;N,α,β), i.e. Pr(acb | N,α,β) >
Pr(bac | N,α,β). According to Lemma 7, Pr(abc | N,α,β) > Pr(bca | N,α,β). Conse-
quently, Pr(a | N,α,β) > Pr(b | N,α,β).
Alternatives most likely to be the best in N3 For the polls of N3, the Borda winner
can be a or b. We show that there is a critical value of α (possibly 0), which depends on
β, above which a is the alternative most likely to be the best and below which it is b. In
particular, if this critical value is 0, this means that a is always the alternative most likely
to be the best. This can happen only when a is the Borda winner. In preparation for the
next proposition, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 16 For every β>0 and every poll N ∈ N3,
Pr(a | N,ˆ α(β;N),β) > Pr(b | N,ˆ α(β;N),β) if a is the Borda winner
Pr(a | N,ˆ α(β;N),β)=P r( b | N,ˆ α(β;N),β) if a and b are Borda winners
Pr(a | N,ˆ α(β;N),β) < Pr(b | N,ˆ α(β;N),β) if b is the Borda winner
Proof. Deﬁne A = νac + νcb + νab and B = νbc + νca + νba. Note that in N3,i fb is the
Borda winner or if a and b are Borda winners, then A<B .Indeed, νab + νac ≤ νba + νbc
20combined with νcb <ν ca give A<B .If a is the Borda winner, we can have A<Bas well
as A ≥ B. Next, note that the following statements are equivalent:
Pr(a | N,ˆ α(β;N),β) T Pr(b | N,ˆ α(β;N),β)
Pr(acb | N,ˆ α(β;N),β) T Pr(bca | N,ˆ α(β;N),β)
M (acb;N,ˆ α(β;N),β) T M (bca;N,ˆ α(β;N),β)
ˆ α(β;N)(A − B) T −β (νab − νba)
If a is the Borda winner and if A ≥ B, we immediately have:
ˆ α(β;N)(A − B)+β (νab − νba) > 0
If a is the Borda winner and if A<B ,we have
ˆ α(β;N)(A − B)+β(νab− νba) >β (A − B)+β(νab− νba)=2 νac+2 νab− 2νbc− 2νba > 0
since ˆ α(β;N) <βin this case. For the case where a and b are Borda winners, replace the
inequalities by equalities in the last expression. Reverse the inequalities if b is the Borda
winner.
Proposition 17 For every β ≥ 0 and every poll N ∈ N3, ∃˜ α(β;N) ≥ 0:
Pr(a;N,α,β) T Pr(b;N,α,β) ⇔ 0 <αT ˜ α(β;N)
Proof. Consider the equation:
Pr(abc | N,α,β)+P r( acb | N,α,β)=P r( bac | N,α,β)+P r( bca | N,α,β) (7)
The left-hand side is Pr(a | N,α,β) and the right-hand side is Pr(b | N,α,β). We look for
the solution to this equation. Let us deﬁne the two terms C and D by:
C =P r ( abc | N,α,β) − Pr(bac | N,α,β)
D =P r ( acb | N,α,β) − Pr(bca | N,α,β)
The above equation can also be written as C + D =0 .
From Lemma 4 and Proposition 12, we know that:
νab + νbc + νac >ν ba + νac + νbc > max{νac + νcb + νab,ν bc + νca + νba}
Thus, M (abc;N,α,β) increases more rapidly than M (bac;N,α,β), and the latter more
rapidly than both M (acb;N,α,β) and M (bca;N,α,β), as α increases. It follows that
21Pr(abc | N,α,β) increases monotonically with α. Thus, Pr(acb | N,α,β) and Pr(bca | N,α,β)
c a nb em a d ea ss m a l la sn e c e s s a r yw i t hα suﬃciently large.
Suppose now that b is the Borda winner. By deﬁnition of ˆ α(β;N) and by Lemma
16, we have C =0and D<0. Increasing α from ˆ α(β;N) increases Pr(abc | N,α,β).
The value of Pr(bac | N,α,β) may also increase for a while but less than Pr(abc | N,α,β).
Thus, C increases monotonically with α. As for D, it may decrease initially (increase in
absolute terms) but, for suﬃciently large values of α, it will get close to 0. Since this behavior
is continuous, there exists a unique number ˜ α(β;N) > ˆ α(β;N) such that C + D =0 ,
i.e. such that Pr(a;N,α,β)=P r ( b;N,α,β). Moreover, α ≶ ˜ α(β;N) ⇒ C + D ≶ 0 ⇒
Pr(a;N,α,β) ≶ Pr(b;N,α,β).
Suppose next that a is the Borda winner. We now have C =0and D>0. By the same
argument as above, starting from ˆ α(β;N),Cdecreases monotonically with α. As for D, it
may increase or decrease in the beginning but, for a suﬃciently low value of α, it will be
positive since νab, the coeﬃcient of β in Pr(acb | N,α,β), is larger than νba, the coeﬃcient
of β in Pr(bca | N,α,β). Two cases can arise:
• a positive value of α, such that C +D =0 , is reached. This value is ˜ α(β;N). As when
b is the Borda winner, α ≶ ˜ α(β;N) ⇒ C + D ≶ 0 ⇒ Pr(a;N,α,β) ≶ Pr(b;N,α,β).
• C+D>0 ∀α ≤ ˆ α(β;N). In this case, we set ˜ α(β;N)=0and we have Pr(a;N,α,β) >
Pr(b;N,α,β) ∀α ≥ 0.
Combining Lemma 16 and Proposition 17, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 18 For every β>0 and every poll N ∈ N3,
ˆ α(β;N) > ˜ α(β;N) if a is the Borda winner
ˆ α(β;N)=˜ α(β;N) if a and b are Borda winners
ˆ α(β;N) < ˜ α(β;N) if b is the Borda winner
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate two typical behaviors of ˜ α and ˆ α. The ﬁrst one is obtained from
the following poll borrowed from Condorcet (1785), and in which b is the Borda winner:
alternatives abc
a − 31 31
b 29 − 37
c 29 23 −
22Young (1988) uses this poll to show that the Kemeny rule does not necessarily select the
alternative most likely to be the best. This is the case here for α<˜ α(0) = 0.225, i.e. for
a probability of ordering correctly two alternatives less than 0.556. More interestingly, this
ﬁgure shows that the performance of Γp in selecting the best alternative improves as β gets
larger. Indeed, this performance is better the smaller the interval (ˆ α(β;N), ˜ α(β;N)). It is
only within this interval that Γp does not select the alternative most likely to be the best.












Figure 2: Typical behavior of ˆ α and ˜ α when b is the Borda winner.
Figure 3 is drawn from the following poll, in which a is the Borda winner:
alternatives abc
a − 13 12
b 8 − 16
c 95−




. This follows from Young’s result, which,
transposed to our context, says that for β =0and α suﬃciently small, the alternative most





. It decreases monotonically thereafter.
The behavior of ˜ α with respect to ˆ α depicted in Figures 2 and 3 seems to be quite
general. We found numerically that it is typical of all polls in N3 with 3 ≤ n ≤ 12.









Figure 3: Typical behavior of ˆ α and ˜ α when a is the Borda winner.
It is thus also typical of all replicas of these polls. The reason is that, as β gets larger,
Pr(abc | N,ˆ α(β;N),β) and Pr(bac | N,ˆ α(β;N),β) both get larger and, because of this,
the term D in the proof of Proposition 17 gets smaller, thus requiring a smaller departure
from ˆ α(β;N). However, given the form of the probability function used in this section, a
rigorous proof of this fact appears to be out of reach.
7 Conclusion
Condorcet (1785) initiated the statistical approach to vote aggregation. Young (1988) clari-
ﬁed Condorcet’s contribution and showed that a correct application of the maximum likeli-
hood principle leads to the Kemeny rule. This result is based on the assumption that judges
or voters rank correctly two alternatives is the same for all pairs of alternative.
In this paper, we relaxed this assumption, adopting the point of view that the probability
of comparing correctly two alternatives is an increasing function of the distance between them
in the true ranking. We showed that the aggregation rule that consists in selecting the most
probable ranking under this more reasonable assumption, diﬀers in many respects from the
Kemeny rule. We also provided a systematic analysis of the case of three alternatives. Due
to the complexity of the problem, it was hardly possible to go further with more alternatives.
24The approach adopted here, as in the previous literature, relies on the assumption that
votes are independent from one pair of alternatives to the other. Thus, if a voter or a judge
order alternatives pair by pair, there is a positive probability that a cycle will emerge from
the vote, even if this probability is conditional on an order. This is inherent to the binary
approach, which Saari often criticizes in his writings. For example, Saari and Merlin (1997)
make the following remark about the Kemeny rule (KR):
KR buys its consistency at the cost of weakening the crucial assumption about
the individual rationality of the voters. Indeed, KR treats certain preferences as
though they come from non existent voters with cyclic preferences.
As we saw, cyclic preferences have a positive probability in the binary approach. With
a probability function that is increasing with the distance between the two alternatives in a
pair, the probability of a cycle is reduced but not completely eliminated. A topic for further
research is precisely the impact of this independence assumption on our results.
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